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Abstract
This paper is the first to perform a comprehensive estimation of employee stock option ex-
ercise behavior and option cost to firms. We develop a GMM-based methodology, robust to
heteroskedasticity and correlation across exercises, for estimating the rate of voluntary option
exercise as a function of the stock price path and of various firm and option holder character-
istics. We use it to estimate an exercise function for a sample of 1.4 million employee-option
grants to 562,311 employees at 87 publicly-traded firms between 1980–2007. We also esti-
mate the rate of employment termination, which determines forfeitures, cancellations, and
forced exercises. We use the estimated exercise and termination functions in a simulation
based valuation model to analyze the effect of different firm and option holder characteristics
on option value, and show that the true value of these options can differ substantially from
values calculated using the usual modified Black-Scholes approximation.
JEL classification: G14.
With the explosive growth of employee stock options in corporate compensation, in-
vestors, auditors, and regulators have become increasingly concerned about the cost of these
options to shareholders. Recent regulation requiring firms to recognize option cost has inten-
sified the demand for suitable valuation methods. The difficulty is that these are long-lived
American options, so their value depends crucially on how employees exercise them. Yet, be-
cause employees face hedging constraints, standard option theory does not directly apply. For
example, evidence indicates that employees systematically exercise options on non-dividend
paying stocks well before expiration (see, for example, Huddart and Lang (1996), Bettis,
Bizjak, and Lemmon (2005)), which substantially reduces their value.
Pricing by no arbitrage is still possible as long as the exercise decision generates an option
payoff that is subject only to hedgeable risks, such as stock price risk, and diversifiable risks,
such as uncertainties that are idiosyncratic across employees. The option valuation problem
then reduces to accurately characterizing the option payoffs, that is, the exercise policies of
executives. Until recently, however, full-blown estimation has not been possible because of
insufficient data and inadequate methodology. Detailed employee option grant, exercise, and
cancellation data are proprietary and very difficult to obtain for a large number of firms.
In addition, traditional hazard rate models are not suitable for describing voluntary option
exercises, where partial and repeated exercise of options from a given grant is the norm.
This paper is the first to perform a complete empirical estimation of employee stock
option exercise behavior and option cost to firms.
Reliable estimation of any option exercise model requires a large sample that includes
a wide variety of stock price paths. We estimate our model using a comprehensive sample
of option exercise grant and exercise data for 1.4 million employee-option grants to 562,311
employees at 87 publicly-traded firms between 1980–2007. The proprietary data were pro-
vided by corporate participants in a sponsored research project that was funded by the
Society of Actuaries. The methodology presented in this paper is the first step in develop-
ing an actuarial science for valuing compensatory stock options, similar to that for pension
liabilities.
In our estimation we find that the rate of voluntary option exercise is positively related
to the level of the stock price, but not significantly related to volatility, in contrast to what
standard theory would predict. In addition, the exercise rate is higher if the stock price is
in the 90th percentile of its distribution over the past year or if the option has just vested.
The estimated exercise function, together with a model for involuntary terminations, can
be combined with Monte Carlo simulation to calculate the value of these options to sharehold-
ers, taking the employees’ exercise and termination behavior into account. This approach is
similar to the prepayment modeling and valuation methods developed for mortgage-backed
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securities (see, for example, Schwartz and Torous (1989)).
We compare the prices based on our estimation with the modified Black-Scholes (MBS)
method suggested as an approximate valuation technique by the Financial Accounting Stan-
dards Board (FASB). We find that the MBS approximation can exhibit significant pricing
errors, which are even greater for underwater options than at-the-money options.
1 Previous Literature
The principles of employee option stock valuation and the need to study exercise behavior are
well-understood in the literature. One approach that has been taken is to model the exercise
decision theoretically. The employee presumably chooses an option exercise policy as part
of a greater utility maximization problem that includes other decisions, such as portfolio,
consumption, and effort choice, and this typically leads to early exercise for the purpose of
diversification. Papers that develop utility-maximizing models and then calculate the implied
cost of options to shareholders include Huddart (1994), Detemple and Sundaresan (1999),
Ingersoll (2006), Leung and Sircar (2009), and Carpenter, Stanton, and Wallace (2009).
Combining theory and data, papers such as Carpenter (1998) and Bettis et al. (2005)
calibrate utility-maximizing models to mean exercise times and stock prices in the data,
and then infer option value. However, these papers provide no formal estimation and the
approach relies on the validity of the utility-maximizing models used. Huddart and Lang
(1996) and Heath, Huddart, and Lang (1999) provide more flexible empirical descriptions of
option exercise patterns, but do not go as far as option valuation. Two recent approaches,
Armstrong, Jagolinzer, and Larcker (2006) and Klein and Maug (2009) estimate exercise
behavior using a hazard model, but this specification is inappropriate for option valuation
because employees exercise random fractions of outstanding option grants.
A number of analytic methods for approximating executive stock option value have also
been proposed in the literature. The FASB currently permits using the Black-Scholes formula
with the expiration date replaced by the option’s expected life. Jennergren and Na¨slund
(1993), Carr and Linetsky (2000)), and Cvitanic´, Wiener, and Zapatero (2004) derive analytic
formulas for option value assuming exogenously specified exercise boundaries and stopping
rates. Hull and White (2004) propose a model in which exercise occurs when the stock
price reaches an exogenously specified multiple of the stock price and forfeiture occurs at
an exogenous rate. However, until the accuracy of these methods can be determined, the
usefulness of these approximations cannot be assessed.
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2 Modeling Exercise Behavior
2.1 Hazard Rates
At first sight, it seems natural to use hazard rates to model the exercise of employee stock
options, since they have often been used in the finance literature to model apparently similar
events, such as mortgage prepayment (see Schwartz and Torous (1989)) and corporate bond
default (see, for example, Duffie and Singleton (1999)).1 However, whereas it makes sense
to think of the prepayment of one mortgage as independent of the prepayment of another,
conditional on the level of interest rates, ESOs are typically exercised in blocks. As a
result, the exercise of one option in a given grant held by an individual is extremely highly
correlated with the exercise of another option in the same grant held by the same individual.
It is also quite highly correlated with the exercise of options in other grants held by the
same individual. This high degree of correlation between options makes it difficult to use
standard econometric techniques, which assume independence between events, to estimate
hazard rates at the individual option level.2
One attempt to solve this problem was suggested by Armstrong et al. (2006). Instead of
using a hazard rate to model the exercise of individual options, they use a hazard rate to
model the exercise behavior of an entire grant of options held by an individual. Aggregating
in this way gets around the problem of correlation between individual option exercises, but it
introduces a new problem. Whereas a hazard rate describes an event with two states – either
something has happened, or it has not – the proportion of an option grant that is exercised
in a given period is essentially a continuous variable, which can take on any value between
zero and one. Armstrong et al. (2006) work with the dummy variable Exercisei,k,t, which
indicates whether or not employee i exercises at least 25% of the vested and unexercised
options in grant k on day t (and at least 10% of all options from the grant). This addresses
some of the correlation issues described above, but introduces new problems of its own.
First, unlike, say, death from a disease, this variable can equal one more than once, so
standard hazard rate estimation techniques may not immediately apply. Second, important
information is lost in this aggregation process. For example, consider two option holders who
have the same likelihood of exercising on any given date, however, option holder 1 always
1A hazard rate is defined as the likelihood (per period) of an option’s being exercised in the next instant,
conditional on not having being exercised previously. For good introductions to hazard rate analysis, see
Cox (1972) or Kalbfleisch and Prentice (1980).
2This issue also arises in modeling corporate bond default. One popular solution, when the number of
firms involved is small, has been to use “copula functions”, which explicitly model this correlation [See,
for example, Li (2001)]. However, in our case the number of options (and hence the number of correlation
coefficients) is too high to be feasible.
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exercises 25% of the remaining grant whenever he exercises, whereas option holder 2 always
exercises 100% of his remaining options. The conditional probability of a given option’s
being exercised at any instant is four times as high for options held by option holder 2 versus
option 1, so their options will have very different values, yet the Exercise variable modeled
by Armstrong et al. (2006) would behave exactly the same way for the two option holders.
Their valuation methodology assumes 100% of a given vesting tranche is exercised at the
hazard rate estimated for exercises in excess of 25%, an inconsistency which would appear
to overstate the rate of early exercise and understate option value. Klein and Maug (2009)
use a similar approach, counting exercises as events if the fraction exercised out of a given
vesting tranche exceeds a pre-specified threshold, and thus fail to model the distribution of
the fraction exercised. Moreover, they do not appear to account for the correlation between
exercises of different vesting tranches from the same grant.
2.2 Modeling Fractional Exercise
A solution to all of the problems above is to abandon the hazard rate approach altogether and
instead to model the fraction of each grant exercised each period. Heath et al. (1999) follow
this approach, regressing the fraction of each grant exercised against various explanatory
variables. However, their regression approach has some problems. In particular, it may
generate expected exercise fractions that are negative or greater than one, both of which
cause problems for valuation.3 One possible solution is to transform the proportion exercised,
such as by using a logistic transformation,
log
(
y
1− y
)
,
which can take on any value between −∞ and +∞, and use this on the right hand side of the
regression. Unfortunately, by Jensen’s inequality, the expected proportion exercising is not
just the inverse transformation of the expected transformed proportion. More important,
this approach cannot handle the numerous dates on which no options are exercised at all.
Heath et al. (1999) also aggregate across individuals, thus discarding potentially important
information about the differences in exercise behavior across individuals.
Like Heath et al. (1999), we also model the fraction of each grant exercised by each
holder each period, but we do so in a manner that generates consistent estimates of expected
exercise rates that are guaranteed to be between zero and one, while explicitly handling the
correlation between option exercises within and between different grants held by the same
3Attempting to remedy this, for example by truncating the variables, will lead to biases.
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individual. Our approach, based on the fractional logistic approach of Papke and Wooldridge
(1996), also allows for arbitrary heteroskedasticity in the exercise rates.
Let yijt be the fraction exercised at time t of grant j held by individual i, and write
yijt = G(Xijtβ) + uijt, (1)
where Xt is some set of covariates in It, the information set at date t, where G, the expected
fraction exercised at date t, is a function satisfying 0 < G(z) < 1, and where
E(uijt | It) = 0,
E(uijt ui′j′t′) = 0 if i 6= i′ or t 6= t′.
From now on, we shall use the logistic function,
G(Xijtβ) =
exp(Xijtβ)
1 + exp(Xijtβ)
,
which takes on only values between zero and one. Note that, while we are assuming the
residuals ijt are uncorrelated between individuals and across time periods, we are allowing for
ijt to be arbitrarily correlated between different grants held by the same individual at a given
point in time, and we are not making any further assumptions about the exact distribution
of ijt, or even about its variance. In particular, unlike assuming a beta distribution for yijt
(see Mullahy (1990) or Ferrari and Cribari-Neto (2004)), we are allowing a strictly positive
probability that yijt takes on the extreme values zero or one.
As in Papke and Wooldridge (1996), we estimate the parameter vector β using quasi-
maximum likelihood (see Gourie´roux, Monfort, and Trognon (1984)) with the Bernoulli
log-likelihood function,
lijt(β) = yijt log [G(Xijtβ)] + (1− yijt) log [1−G(Xijtβ)] . (2)
Estimation involves solving
max
β
∑
i,j,t
lijt(β).
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The K first order conditions, corresponding to the K elements of β, are given by
∑
i,j,t
dlijt(β)
dβ
=
∑
i,j,t
Xijt
[
G′(Xijtβ)
(
yijt
G(Xijtβ)
− 1− yijt
1−G(Xijtβ)
)]
=
∑
i,j,t
Xijt (yijt −G(Xijtβ)) (3)
= 0.
Equation (1) implies (using iterated expectations) that the population expectation of these
first order conditions is zero, hence this QML estimator, β̂, is a (consistent) GMM estimator
of β, with no assumptions other than Equation (1). Following the notation in Papke and
Wooldridge (1996), define the residual
ûijt ≡ yijt −G(Xijtβ̂),
and define
ĝijt ≡ G′(Xijtβ̂) .
To allow for heteroskedasticity and for correlation between option grants held by a given
individual, write
var(u) = Ω =

Σ1 . . . 0
. . .
... Σi
...
. . .
0 . . . ΣI

,
where each Σ block corresponds to all of the option grants held by a given individual on a
particular date. Then the asymptotic covariance matrix of β̂ takes the “sandwich” form (see
Gourie´roux et al. (1984)),
var
(
β̂
)
= Â
−1
B̂Â−1,
where
Â =
∑
i,j,t
∂2lijt(β̂)
∂β∂β′
=
∑
i,j,t
ĝijtXijtX
′
ijt, (4)
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and
B̂ = X′Ω̂X,
where X is a matrix containing all of the stacked Xijt values, and Ω̂ is a consistent estimator
of Ω given by
Ω̂ =

Σ̂1 . . . 0
. . .
... Σ̂i
...
. . .
0 . . . Σ̂I

where
Σ̂i = ûiû
′
i.
This covariance matrix is robust both to arbitrary heteroskedasticity and to arbitrary cor-
relation between the residuals in a given block.4
3 Data
As discussed above, our estimation strategy is carried out using a proprietary data set com-
prising complete histories of employee stock option grants, vesting structures, and option
exercise and cancellation events for all employees who received options at 87 publicly traded
corporations between 1983 and 2007.5 As shown in Table 1, there is considerable heterogene-
ity in the sample of firms both in terms of their industry type (reported at one-digit Standard
Industrial Classification (SIC) codes) and in terms of the firm sizes measured by market cap
and numbers of employees. The largest firms in terms of both market capitalization and
numbers of employees are in the financial services sector (SIC 6) and the transportation and
communications sector (SIC 4). There are also significant differences in revenue growth rates
across sectors. Firms in construction and heavy manufacturing, SIC 1 and 2, delivered the
highest revenue growth rate of about 75% in our sample. The lowest revenue growth rate
over the period was in the financial services, insurance and real estate sector, SIC 6. The
high-tech computer sector of manufacturing, SIC 3, firms in the sample appear to have been
significantly affected by the dot.com bust of 2001 and 2002 compared to the construction
and heavy manufacturing sector. All the sectors generated positive revenue grow rates and
4For further discussion of calculating standard errors in the presence of clustering, see Rogers (1993),
Baum, Schaffer, and Stillman (2003), Wooldridge (2003) and Petersen (2008).
5The data were obtained as part of a research grant written by the authors and funded by the Society
of Actuaries. In addition, we thank Terrence Adamson at AON Consulting who also provided data for this
study.
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several of these growth rates were substantial such as the transportation, communications
and utilities, SIC 4, that generated about a 53% revenue growth rate. The service sector rev-
enue growth rates were lower for the non-healthcare services (SIC 7) firms which are smaller
firms both in terms of numbers of employees and market capitalization rate and higher for
the healthcare firms in SIC 8.
Our unit of analysis is an employee-grant-day. For each option grant we merge the
appropriate path of daily split-adjusted stock prices and dividends, starting at the initial
grant date, to the path of outstanding option vesting and exercise events for all grants and
employees. These daily paths are constructed using detailed information on the contractual
option vesting structure, the exercise events, and the cancellation events recorded for each
grant. We track the employee-grant-days and a series of time-varying covariates until the
options in the grant are fully exercised, the options are cancelled, or we reach the end of the
sample period of December 30, 2007.
There is significant heterogeneity in the contractual structure of the option grants both
across and within firms in our sample. In Table 2, we report the summary statistics for the
number of grants per employee over the sample period. To preserve the anonymity of the
firms, we report the summary statistics by two-digit SIC groupings using the SIC designation
for each firm that is reported in CRSP. As shown in the Table 2, there is considerable
variability in the numbers of grants per employee across firms. The mean number of grants
per employee ranges from 1.61 grants for firms in the Educational Services sector (SIC 82)
to 5.11 grants per employee in the building construction sector. There is also considerable
variability within sectors where the number of grants per employee ranges from one to as
many as 73 in the health services sector (SIC 80) and 64 in the Chemicals and allied products
sector (SIC 28). For the firms, where we have the employee ranking of the employee, the
largest grant recipients are typically the CEO or senior managers.
Another feature of the option granting structure is the number of options that are as-
sociated with each grant. As shown in Table 3, there is again considerable variability both
across industry sectors and within firms. The number of options have been multiplied by
the ratio of the firms stock price to the global average stock price so that summary statistics
control for the effect of relatively valuable options where the grants are small and large grants
when the stock price is relatively low compared to the sample average. As shown, the mean
standardized grant sizes are largest in the health services (SIC 80), industrial machinery
and computers sector (SIC 35), rubber and plastic products (SIC 30), and amusement and
recreation services (SIC 79). The range of the standardized option grant sizes is also large.
For example, in the industrial machinery and computes (SIC 35) the number of options per
grant ranges from 1.0 to more than one hundred and two million standardized and split-
8
adjusted options in a single grant. As shown, many of the option grants across industries
involved large numbers of options and these single grant option positions frequently involved
millions of options for the senior managers and CEO of these firms. The combined effects of
the large number of grants per employee and the size of these grants implies that individual
employees are likely to hold large inventories of options with different strikes and vesting
structures. This feature of the data introduces significant correlation across the exercise
decisions of individual employees. As discussed above, the exercise decision for one option in
a given grant held by an individual is highly correlated with the exercise of another option
in the same grant held by the same individual. In addition, there would be correlation in the
exercise decisions across grants that are held by the same individual. A particular strength
of our fractional logistic estimator is that it does not require assumptions of independence
across exercise events. We also pool by employee and correct our standard errors to account
for our pooled structure.
Table 4 provides summary statistics for the maximum number of contractual vesting
dates required before the options in a given grant fully vest. The means range between one
vesting date for the petroleum, refining and related sector (SIC 29) and 14.9 for firms in the
electronic and other electrical sector (SIC 36). Here again, the range of vesting structures
across firms within a sector are very important. An example of a vesting structure that
would lead to a large maximum would be a grant with a 25% vest at the end of the first year
and then 2.08% monthly vests over the next 36 months. The minima are generated by what
are termed “cliff vests” where all the options in a given grant vest on the same day. Another
feature of the grants that exhibits important heterogeneity across firms is the percentage of
options that vest on the first vesting dates. As shown in Table 5, the range of the mean
percentage of options that vest on the first vesting date is between 20% to 100% across the
SIC defined sectors. The within sector variance is also important and the percentage of the
grants that vest on the first vesting date ranges between 1% to 100%. An 100% vest is
also associated with the common “cliff vest” structure and these vests can occur within one
month of issuance.
The summary statistics for the overall time that it takes to fully vest the grants are
reported in Table 6. As shown, the mean number of months required for the grants to fully
vest is between 7.97 months in the communications sector (SIC 48) and 59.99 months in
the educational services sector (SIC 82). The within sector variation is between zero, in
which case the grant fully vests on the first grant date, to a maximum of 121 months in the
communications sector (SIC 48). The only homogeneous contractual feature of employee
stock option grants across firms is the maturity in months from the issuance date to the date
of expiry. As shown in Table 7, the term of executive stock options is quite uniformly ten
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years although there are some twenty-year and one-year maturity options granted on the
part of some firms. At the employee-level, the employees in our sample are in some cases
managing as many as ten different contractual option vesting structures in their inventory
of options.
The vesting structure also affects the observed patterns of exercise events. Table 8
presents the summary statistics for the remaining term on the option at the time the option
is exercised. Since on average the options in our sample have terms of ten years, these high
mean values imply that on average the options in our sample are exercised when there is
nearly two-thirds of the option term remaining. These patterns are consistent with those
documented by Huddart and Lang (1996). The only sector that does not exhibit this per-
sistent early exercise behavior on the part of employees is fabricated metal products (SIC
34) and communications (SIC 48). The summary statistics reported in Table 9 suggest that
on average the options are exercised close to the vesting dates, controlling for the number
of days in the interval that the option was in-the-money. The chemicals and allied products
firms (SIC 28), petroleum refining and related (SIC 29), and communications (SIC 48) sec-
tors, however, appear to be exceptions to this pattern with mean times between the prior
vesting date and the exercise date of 1,069.8, 1057.6, and 2865.3 days respectively.
Table 10 reports the summary statistics for the ratio of the stock price to the exercise
price on the option. Not at all surprisingly, these ratios are all greater than one, but again
there is very important variation in the ratios both across and within sectors. The very high
ratios reflect the run-up in the stock market during our sample period. Overall, both the
vesting structure and the option exercise patterns lead to the persistence of early exercise
behavior in some industrial sectors but with considerable heterogeneity both within and
across the sectors.
Another characteristic that we document in these data is the importance of fractional
exercise behavior. As shown in Table 11, the mean percentage of vested options in a grant
that are exercised is significantly less than one across all the industry sectors. The means
range from about 31.37% in the engineering, accounting, and management services sector
(SIC 87) to a high of about 90.63% in the petroleum refining and related sector (SIC 29).
There is also consider heterogeneity within firms in the industry sectors. Thus, on average
employees typically exercise substantially less than 100% of the outstanding vested options
of a grant even though all the vested options in the grant would also be in-the-money. It
is this central feature of option exercise behavior that motivates the development of our
fractional logistic estimation strategy.
In summary, there are three features of the stock option exercise patterns observed in our
sample of 1,475,492 option grants and 873,924 option exercises. First, many employees hold
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more than one option grant and make exercise decisions over more than one vested option at
any given time. For this reason, estimation strategies must account for the correlated decision
structure of employee option exercise. Second, both the contractual vesting structure and the
exogenous price paths appear to have strong effects on option exercise patterns, thus careful
controls for both of these feature on a daily basis must be included in a successful estimation
strategy. Finally, most option positions are exercised fractionally, that is the proportion of
the outstanding options that are exercised at exercise events is, on average, substantially
less than one. For this reason, a successful econometric methodology must account for path
dependent fractional exercise behavior or risk introducing significant misspecification bias
and inaccurate forecasts of exercise timing.
3.1 The covariates
As discussed at length in our companion paper, Carpenter et al. (2009), since employee
stock options are non-transferable, the optimal exercise policy for these options can look
quite different from that for standard American call options. The intuition that the need for
diversification can lead an employee to sacrifice some option value by exercising early is well
understood in the theoretical literature. However, an explicit theory of the optimal exercise
of executive stock options that could be taken directly to data is still developing. Formal
theory of the optimal exercise of multiple executive stock option grants is even less developed,
although intuition suggests that the greater the option holder’s total forced exposure to the
stock risk, the greater the exercise rate. Despite the potential limitations of prior theoretical
research, we consider two types of path-dependent covariates in our empirical specification
of fractional exercise timing. We use both fundamental state variables that have appeared
in prior theoretical analyses of optimal stock option exercise policies as well as “behavioral”
variables that have been identified in recent empirical options exercise studies (See Huddart
and Lang (1996); Heath et al. (1999); Huddart and Lang (2003); Malmendier and Tate
(2005); and Armstrong et al. (2006)).
Even the most parsimonious theoretical models define the optimal exercise policies of
executive stock options in terms of the time series dynamics of the underlying stock price
in conjunction with the contractual timing of options’ vesting structures and the timing of
expirations. Successful development of empirical models of exercise timing require richer
theoretical treatments of the exercise function in terms of variables such as the wealth of
the option holder, the holdings of other options and restricted stock, the volatility of the
underlying stock price, the portion of risk that is hedgeable using other assets, and the
dividend payout structure of the firm. Unfortunately, the theoretical literature that focuses
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on these richer models is not well developed. The broader theoretical framework of Carpenter
et al. (2009) allows for a number of empirically testable predictions concerning the average
lives of employee stock options, and we draw upon a number of these predictions to motivate
the specification choices for our fractional logistic estimator. A first strong result from the
model is that the higher the firm’s dividend rate the more likely that the employee will
exercise, since loss of dividend through option ownership is a cost of the option that could
be avoided through exercise. A second prediction is that the higher correlation of the stock’s
price with the market (the higher beta), the less likely that exercise will occur. In addition
we find that, unlike the standard intuition for the exercise of American calls, volatility does
not lead to a clean prediction and may lead both to earlier or later exercise in the case of non-
transferable stock options.6 For this reason, we consider the effect of stock price volatility on
the optimal exercise policy as an open empirical question. Standard intuition holds that risk
averse employees are likely to exercise later and the cost of their options is higher. Similarly,
employees with decreasing absolute risk aversion will exercise later, implying greater option
cost, if they have more non-option wealth and this intuition is again supported in Carpenter
et al. (2009). This final prediction not only requires information on the stock price paths
but also requires proxies for the risk preferences of the employees who hold the options.
In Table 12 we present the summary statistics for the path dependent covariates. The
first four rows of the table present the common state variables in theoretical analyses of
optimal employee option exercise policies. The price-to-strike ratio is the employee-grant-
day observation of the ratio of the split-adjusted price of the stock to the split-adjusted strike
price on the option. The stock return volatility is the standard deviation of the daily stock
returns, as reported in CRSP, over the prior thirty trading days from each employee-grant-
day. The firm beta was estimated for each firm using market and firm data from CRSP and
interest rate data from the Federal Reserve Board over a five year interval (in some cases
the interval is shorter) and is a constant for each firm. The estimated mean beta is about
1.03 and the standard deviation is about 0.32 over the sample period.
Recent empirical studies of employee stock option exercise report links between behavioral
indicators, or “rules of thumb”, that employees appear to rely upon in making their option
exercise decisions. Armstrong et al. (2006) find a statistically significant association between
the timing of vesting events and option exercise. They argue that recent exercise events both
mechanically affect an employees’ ability to exercise their options and may also serve as a
periodic reminder to employees to evaluate the value of their option positions. Heath et al.
(1999) and Armstrong et al. (2006) also find a statistically significant positive association
6Option values increase in volatility in both standard option pricing theory and in the case of executive
stock option models with an exogenously specified exercise boundary, such as Cvitanic´ et al. (2004).
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between option exercise and the occurrence of the current stock price exceeding the 90th
percentile of the past year’s price distribution. They argue that this association is driven by
cognitive benchmarks that employees use in their decision rules. Given the importance of
these variables in prior studies, we also include them as controls in all of our specifications.
Our measure of vesting structure is the variable vesting period within two weeks. It is an
indicator variable that is one if the employee-grant-day is within two weeks of a vesting event
and zero otherwise. Our cognitive benchmark proxy is the variable price relative to the 90th
percentile. It is an indicator variable that is equal to one if the observed stock price is greater
than or equal to 90th percentile of the stock price distribution over the prior year of trading
and zero otherwise. We report the summary statistics for these variables in the lower panel
of Table 12. As shown in the table, about 3.4% of employee-grant-days are within two weeks
of a vesting date, on average, and about 60% of the employee-grant-days are at prices that
exceed the 90th percentile of the past year’s price distribution, reflecting the large stock
price run-ups in the sample period.
A prior empirical literature has found evidence that older individuals are more risk averse
in financial decision making than younger individuals and that females appear to be more risk
averse than males in their financial decisions (See Bajtelsmit and Bernasek (2001); Bellante
and Green (2004); and Armstrong et al. (2006)). As previously discussed, economic intuition
suggests that less risk averse employees are likely to exercise later and consequently the cost
of their options is greater. For a subset of firms in our sample, we have information on the
age, sex, and salary of the employees. The summary statistics for these variables are reported
in Table 13. As shown, the subset of the data that includes salary is quite small. The mean
salary is about $294,000 (the median about $175,000) and there is significant range between
about $11,000 and $368 million dollars in annual salary. We have information for a subset
of about 203,897 employees and as shown in the table the mean age is about 44 years old.
Surprisingly, the youngest option recipient is only seventeen years old and the oldest is 85
years old. In a somewhat smaller subsample (172,523 employees for gender and 350,199
employees for employment status), we have information about the gender and employment
status of the employee. In this subsample, 55% of employees are male. About 1% of the
employees are executives and about 1% are board members. The manager category, about
14% of the subsample, includes all employees designated as manager, and the other category
includes all administrative personnel, logistics personnel, and engineers among many other
categories. Our expectation is that, everything else equal, women and older employees will
exercise later and that the larger non-diversifiable wealth positions of executives will lead
them to exercise earlier.
In Table 14, we report the rates of option cancellation events per year. These covariates
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are important in the valuation simulations since they add three additional reasons for option
terminations and they have potentially important effects on the probability of option exercise.
The employee stock options in our sample can be cancelled for five reasons: repricing, death,
retirement, and termination from the firm for either voluntary or involuntary reasons, or
reason unknown. Since we only observed about 4,000 repricings in the sample we ignored the
effects of these events. Cancellations as the result of death, retirement and job termination
would be expected to force early option exercise since employees are required to relinquish
their option positions within 60 days of any of the three events. Therefore, we drop all
exercises within six months prior to any of these events in the estimation of the rate of
voluntary exercise. Of the 594,660 employees for whom we have cancellation information,
the most common reason was job termination. We also had 3679 retirements and 1990 deaths.
Table 14 reports the annual proportion of employees who begin a year holding options and
are subject to a cancellation at some time during that year due to a job termination, a death,
retirement, or an unknown reason. The job termination rates appear to cyclical from 1983
falling in booms and rising in busts. The overall annual average is 6.3% job termination
rates both voluntary and involuntary over the sample period. The annual retirement rate is
about 2% and the annual death rate is about .5%. As shown in the last column of Table 14,
there are also fairly large number of cancellation events each year for which we were not
provided with the reason for the cancellation.
Table 15 we report the annual involuntary and voluntary job termination rates for em-
ployees in each of the one-digit SIC sectors. As shown in the table, the rates of job churn in
the Services sector (SIC 7 and SIC8) are relatively high over most years. More cyclical job
termination rates are evident in the computer sector (SIC3) when the dot.com bust led to
significant levels of job churn and for the communications industry (SIC4) in 2004, 2005, and
again in 2007 again due to retrenchment in the sector. The lowest overall job termination
rates are found in the retail sector (SIC5) and the heavy manufacturing sector (SIC2). These
two sectors also appear to be significantly less cyclical over the sample period. The financial
services sector (SIC 6) experienced job termination turmoil in the recession of 2003 and early
2000.
In summary, the covariates used in the fractional logistic specification include the salient
state variables related to stock price paths, volatility, and market risk that have been the
focus of the recent theoretical literature on employee stock option valuation and cost. In
addition, we proxy for factors such as risk aversion and possible cognitive benchmarks using
the covariates gender, age, salary, and employment status. We use this rich set of covariates
to explore a set of theoretically motivated null hypotheses that have appeared in the recent
literature. These nulls include: 1) higher dividend rates should make option exercise more
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likely; 2) more risk aversion should make early option exercise more likely; 3) higher volatility
is an empirical question, since theoretically it could lead to either earlier or later exercise in
a utility maximizing framework; 4) higher correlation with the market makes earlier exercise
less likely; and 5) an employee’s optimal exercise policy may involve exercising when the
stock price exceeds a critical boundary. We report the results of these tests in the next
section of the paper.
4 Estimation Results
Table 16 shows the results of applying our procedure to the sample of voluntary option
exercises described above. We report our results the baseline model with fixed effects at
the one-digit SIC code level. The standard errors are reported in parentheses below the
coefficient estimates and the estimator clusters at the level of the individual employee.
As shown in the table, the rate of voluntary option exercise is consistently positively
related to the level of the stock price as expected. As previously discussed, Carpenter et al.
(2009) argue that unlike the standard intuition for the exercise of American calls, volatility
does not lead to a clearly signed prediction on an employee’s optimal exercise policy. The
results reported in Table 16 indicate that once we introduce controls for industry fixed
effects, increased levels of stock return volatility are associated with smaller fractions of
options exercised, however, the estimate is not statistically significant at standard levels.
As shown in Table 16, the coefficient estimate on firm beta is negative and statistically
significant in specification.7 We interpret this result as only weak support of our ex ante
expectations concerning the effect of beta on executive stock option exercise.
As reported in Table 16 when the stock price is greater than or equal to the 90th percentile
of the trading price distribution in the prior three hundred and sixty trading days, the fraction
of options that are exercised is also statistically significant and positive. We also find a
statistically significant and positive association between the percentage of options that are
exercised and recent vesting events, measured by an indicator of whether the exercise event
was within a two week window of the last vesting date. As discussed previously, these results
are consistent with the earlier empirical studies of Heath et al. (1999) and Armstrong et al.
(2006), who argue that employees may tie their exercise decisions to cognitive benchmarks
as a means of reducing monitoring costs. As shown in Table 16 the vesting structure has a
positive and statistically significant effect on exercise behavior and employees tend to exercise
7Part of the problem with the firm beta covariate is that we are currently measuring a fixed beta for each
firm. In later versions of this paper, we plan to use annual estimates of firms’ betas using CRSP aggregate
files
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larger fractions of options closer to vesting dates. The exercise of vested options in a grant
is also statistically associated with the remaining time on the option. Our results indicate
that employees are less likely to exercise large fractions of their outstanding vested options
when the remaining time is long suggesting that risk aversion is confounded with the effects
of the remaining term on the option grant.
5 Option Cost to the Firm
For an individual option, the exercise function describes the expected proportion of each
outstanding option grant to be voluntarily exercised at a given time and state, conditional on
having survived to that point. If the event that the option is actually exercised is sufficiently
independent across option holders with identical exercise functions, conditional on the given
time and state, then in a large enough pool of such option holders, the fraction of options
exercised voluntarily will exactly equal the exercise function. Similarly, the termination
function describes the fraction of options stopped through termination in a diversified pool.
We assume that such diversification is possible, or, more generally, that the conditional
variance in the number of options actually exercised around the expected value is not a
priced risk in the market, so that option valuation proceeds as if perfect diversification were
possible.
Given the estimated voluntary exercise rate per period, G(Xβ), and termination rate λ,
the value of the option is given by its expected risk-neutral discounted payoff,
Ot = E
∗
t{
∫ T
t∨tv
e−r(τ−t) (Sτ −K)+ (Gτ + λ)e−
R τ
t (Gs+λ) ds dτ
+e−r(T−t)e−
R T
t (Gs+λ) ds(ST −K)+} , (5)
where tv is the vesting date. To understand the intuition for this expression, note that G+λ
measures the expected fraction of a grant exercising or canceling, measured as a fraction of
the options still unexercised one period earlier. To calculate the expected fraction of today’s
options that exercise or cancel at date t, we therefore need to multiply by the proportion of
the grant outstanding today that has not exercised prior to t, given by
e−
R τ
t Gˆs+λ ds dτ.
We estimate this value with Monte Carlo simulation, using antithetic variates and impor-
tance sampling to increase precision. Tables 17-19 report option values, labeled ESO Value,
for a variety of parameterizations. The tables assuming the option holder voluntarily exer-
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cises according to the estimated exercise rate function in Table 16, and in addition terminates
employment at a constant rate. For the base case, we set the employee age and termination
rate equal to their sample average values. We use SIC 3 as the base case industry and set
the firm volatility to 50%, dividend rate to zero, which is representative of a technology firm.
We set the firm beta to one, the vesting period to two years, and the option expiration date
to ten years.
For comparison, the column labeled Modified Black-Scholes (MBS) gives option value
approximated as the probability of vesting times the Black-Scholes value adjusted for divi-
dends, with contractual expiration date replaced by the option’s expected term, conditional
on vesting. While new methodologies are developing, the FASB accepts this approximation
for accounting valuation, and it is used by the vast majority of firms. Like ESO Value,
we compute the option’s expected life using Monte Carlo simulation assuming the option
holder follows the estimated exercise rate function and terminates employment at a constant
rate. This expectation is with respect to the true probability measure, so it depends on the
true expected return on the stock. We assume the mean stock return is determined by the
CAPM, with a 6% excess expected return on the market.
In theory, the MBS approximation can either understate or overstate the true option
value, depending on the exercise policy. To understand why, consider two special cases,
and for simplicity assume immediate vesting. First, if the option holder follows the value-
maximizing exercise policy in the presence of dividends, as in standard theory, then the true
option value will be greater than the Black-Scholes value to any deterministic expiration date,
so it will exceed the MBS approximation. Alternatively, suppose the option is stopped, either
through exercise or cancellation, at a purely exogenous rate, independent of the stock price,
without regard to whether it is in or out of the money. Then the true option value is the
average Black-Scholes value over possible stopping dates, while the MBS approximation is
Black-Scholes value to the average stopping date, and since the Black-Scholes value tends
to be concave in the option expiration date, the MBS approximation will overstate the true
value. The exercise policies followed in practice contain elements of both of these examples.
The left side of Tables 17-19 focuses on the case of at-the-money options at their grant
date. The right side considers so-called “underwater” options, two years after grant, vested,
but 40% out of the money. With the steep decline in the stock market in the last year,
most firms find that the options they granted to employees before the crash are deeply out
of the money. Many firms are offering their employees equal-present-value exchanges of
at-the-money options for the old out-of-the-money options, perhaps in an effort to restore
performance incentives. The last column of Tables 17-19 shows the exchange ratio. In
general, the MBS value overstates option value for the parameterizations considered here.
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The overstatement is even greater for the underwater options than for the at-the-money
options.
Table 17 shows the effects of changing firm characteristics. The first panel presents
volatility effects. Option value increases much more slowly with volatility than the MBS
approximation does, so the overstatement increases significantly with volatility. The second
panel shows that option value declines with the dividend rate. The MBS approximation
declines even faster so the error declines in algebraic value.
The third panel of Table 17 shows the effect of increasing firm beta. This reduces the
exercise rate, perhaps because of increased hedging opportunities, which increases option
value. Beta has conflicting effects on option expected life. On one hand, its direct effect on
the estimated exercise function is to reduce the exercise rate, which can increase expected
life. On the other hand, under the true measure, it increases the mean stock return, which
means the exercise function is more likely to be evaluated at higher stock prices, which
increases the exercise rate and reduces expected option life. For the parameterization here,
the first effect dominates, and the MBS approximation error is relatively constant.
Table 18 considers certain employee and contract effects. The first panel shows how option
value varies with the termination rate. A higher termination rate increases the chance of pre-
vesting forfeiture, the chance of post-vesting cancellation, and the rate of suboptimal early
exercise, so it reduces option value. It also reduces option life, so the MBS approximation
also declines. The increased noise in the exercise policy should in principle increase the MBS
overstatement, but here that effect is only slight.
The second panel of Table 18 illustrates the effect of increasing the vesting period. A
longer vesting period increases the risk of pre-vesting forfeiture, which reduces option value.
Conditional on vesting, the option stopping time has less room to vary, so the difference
between the option value and the MBS approximation shrinks.
Table 19 shows how option value varies across industry, and how the MBS approximation
varies with the equity premium. The first panel shows the effect of varying the constant
term in the estimated exercise function according to the estimated coefficients on industry
dummies, that is, the base rate of voluntary exercise for different industries. This does not
account for differences in value due to different termination rates, which would also have
an effect. The second panel shows the effect of increasing the mean stock return. This has
no effect ESO value, given the estimated exercise function. However, it reduces the true
expected option life, as it increases the rate at which the option gets in the money, so it
reduces the MBS value and approximation error.
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6 Conclusions
This paper is the first to perform a complete empirical estimation of employee stock option
exercise behavior and option cost to firms. We develop a methodology for estimating option
exercise and cancellation rates as a function of the stock price path, time to expiration,
and firm and option holder characteristics. Our estimation is based on a fractional logistic
approach, and accounts for correlation between exercises by the same executive. Valuation
proceeds by using the estimated exercise rate function to describe the option’s expected
payoff along each stock price path, and then computing the present value of the payoff. The
estimation of empirical exercise rates also allows us to test the predictions of theoretical
models of option exercise behavior.
We apply our estimation technique to the largest dataset yet analyzed in the litera-
ture, consisting of a comprehensive sample of option exercise grant and exercise data for all
employees at 87 publicly traded firms from 1980 to 2007. Our results indicate that using
standard pricing approximations, such as the adjusted Black-Scholes method suggested by
FASB, can lead to significant errors. The proprietary data used in this study were provided
by corporate participants in a sponsored research project that was funded by the Society of
Actuaries, who hope that the results of our study will eventually be used as the standard set
of exercise assumptions to be used in calculating ESO values on firms’ income statements.
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Table 2: Number of Grants Per Employee
This table provides the summary statistics over the sample period for the number of grants that were received
by each employee in the eighty seven firms. We organize the summary statistics by the two-digit firm-level
SIC categories as reported in CRSP.
SIC Industry Number of Mean Standard Minimum Maximum
2-Digit Employees Deviation
15 Building construction 1057 5.11 5.06 1.00 31.00
28 Chemicals and allied products 202895 2.39 1.88 1.00 64.00
29 Petroleum refining and related 166 3.11 3.06 1.00 16.00
30 Rubber and plastics products 156 2.29 2.79 1.00 18.00
33 Primary metal industries 5498 3.60 3.50 1.00 34.00
34 Fabricated metal products 127 2.00 1.87 1.00 18.00
35 Industrial machinery and computers 30688 2.16 1.37 1.00 34.00
36 Electronic and other electrical 46327 3.28 4.36 1.00 39.00
37 Transportation equipment 254 3.69 2.31 1.00 10.00
38 Measuring, analyzing, controlling instruments 6784 2.34 2.19 1.00 22.00
39 Miscellaneous manufacturing 5600 3.13 2.53 1.00 18.00
48 Communications 122180 1.82 1.45 1.00 34.00
49 Electric, gas, and sanitary services 1320 3.71 2.77 1.00 12.00
50 Wholesale trade - Durable goods 6923 1.84 1.95 1.00 18.00
51 Wholesale trade - Non-durable goods 4275 4.18 3.08 1.00 16.00
53 General merchandise stores 10111 3.72 3.39 1.00 28.00
57 Home Furnishing stores 535 2.85 2.18 1.00 10.00
58 Eating and drinking places 3091 2.60 1.91 1.00 20.00
59 Miscellaneous retail 14954 4.88 4.52 1.00 30.00
60 Depository institutions 59012 2.55 3.29 1.00 83.00
62 Brokers, dealers,and exchanges 1823 3.62 3.24 1.00 27.00
63 Insurance carriers 8974 2.29 1.65 1.00 17.00
67 Other investment offices 748 3.36 2.48 1.00 12.00
73 Business services 42339 2.49 2.91 1.00 48.00
79 Amusement and recreation services 504 2.76 2.04 1.00 14.00
80 Health services 14850 3.19 3.26 1.00 73.00
82 Educational services 2614 1.61 1.65 1.00 26.00
87 Engineering, accounting, management ser. 855 4.78 3.14 1.00 14.00
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Table 3: Number of Options Per Grant
This table reports the number of options per grant at issuance. We multiply the total number of shares
granted times the ratio of the price of the stock at the date of issuance to the sample average stock price at
the date of issuance (Si/S¯), where (S¯) is the global average stock price over all the firms in the sample. The
summary statistics are computed over all grants in the sample period. We organize the summary statistics
by the two-digit firm-level SIC categories as reported in CRSP.
SIC Industry Number Mean Standard Minimum Maximum
2-Digit of Grants Deviation
15 Building construction 5396 38,169.5 202,464.9 64.0 8,000,000.0
28 Chemicals and allied products 485518 1,310.9 15,862.8 1.0 6,400,000.0
29 Petroleum refining and related 516 4,369.3 6,358.0 120.0 50,625.0
30 Rubber and plastics products 358 47,570.1 116,767.2 400.0 1,600,000.0
33 Primary metal industries 19814 15,015.3 104,304.1 1.0 6,593,760.0
34 Fabricated metal products 254 7,295.5 9,520.1 100.0 55,403.0
35 Industrial machinery and computers 66228 93,710.4 1,457,224.5 1.0 102,400,000.0
36 Electronic and other electrical 152150 3,349.2 31,146.5 1.0 6,081,664.0
37 Transportation equipment 937 14,443.3 30,210.7 1,000.0 405,000.0
38 Measuring, analyzing, controlling instruments 15865 5,365.6 22,296.6 1.0 900,000.0
39 Miscellaneous manufacturing 17549 7,295.5 55,555.5 50.0 4,452,843.8
48 Communications 221884 751.4 10,830.6 1.0 2,247,030.0
49 Electric, gas, and sanitary services 4903 5,715.2 17,613.8 58.0 800,000.0
50 Wholesale trade - Durable goods 12763 1,681.8 16,616.2 40.0 1,000,000.0
51 Wholesale trade - Non-durable goods 17871 9,087.1 40,751.9 50.0 3,000,000.0
53 General merchandise stores 37599 10,326.8 51,088.0 4.0 5,035,712.0
57 Home Furnishing stores 1524 4,654.5 17,706.1 100.0 480,000.0
58 Eating and drinking places 8041 8,771.3 38,847.2 1.0 1,017,029.3
59 Miscellaneous retail 73029 15,325.0 381,056.4 1.0 77,847,802.7
60 Depository institutions 141211 11,864.4 58,789.0 1.0 4,857,486.3
62 Brokers, dealers,and exchanges 6602 6,401.8 16,453.2 300.0 425,250.0
63 Insurance carriers 20575 3,070.3 11,275.5 1.0 675,000.0
67 Other investment offices 2512 4,515.8 11,090.5 23.0 234,058.0
73 Business services 105248 7,984.9 52,519.1 1.0 4,374,000.0
79 Amusement and recreation services 1393 43,909.4 122,623.7 1,000.0 1,600,000.0
80 Health services 47445 99,410.2 830,404.9 8.0 76,800,000.0
82 Educational services 4221 902.0 4,081.6 5.0 100,000.0
87 Engineering, accounting, management ser. 4086 3,035.8 12,484.5 50.0 444,900.0
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Table 4: Maximum Number of Vesting Periods per Grant
This table reports the maximum number of vesting periods required to fully vest a given option grant. The
summary statistics are computed over all grants in the sample period. We organize the summary statistics
by the two-digit firm-level SIC categories as reported in CRSP.
SIC Industry Number Mean Standard Minimum Maximum
2-Digit of Grants Deviation
15 Building construction 5396 3.62 0.87 1.00 4.00
28 Chemicals and allied products 485518 2.52 6.01 1.00 43.00
29 Petroleum refining and related 516 1.00 0.00 1.00 1.00
30 Rubber and plastics products 358 3.05 0.21 3.00 4.00
33 Primary metal industries 19814 3.58 1.04 1.00 4.00
34 Fabricated metal products 254 2.19 1.89 1.00 6.00
35 Industrial machinery and computers 66228 3.97 0.65 2.00 6.00
36 Electronic and other electrical 152150 14.90 12.55 1.00 49.00
37 Transportation equipment 937 2.91 0.42 1.00 3.00
38 Measuring, analyzing, controlling instruments 15865 8.83 13.77 1.00 48.00
39 Miscellaneous manufacturing 17549 3.41 0.49 3.00 4.00
48 Communications 221884 1.12 0.55 1.00 4.00
49 Electric, gas, and sanitary services 4903 3.65 0.48 3.00 4.00
50 Wholesale trade - Durable goods 12763 1.15 0.52 1.00 3.00
51 Wholesale trade - Non-durable goods 17871 2.44 1.22 1.00 5.00
53 General merchandise stores 37599 4.78 0.42 3.00 7.00
57 Home Furnishing stores 1524 2.97 0.27 1.00 4.00
58 Eating and drinking places 8041 3.51 1.88 1.00 5.00
59 Miscellaneous retail 73029 3.35 1.32 1.00 34.00
60 Depository institutions 141211 2.35 1.19 1.00 8.00
62 Brokers, dealers,and exchanges 6602 3.00 0.12 1.00 8.00
63 Insurance carriers 20575 3.45 0.60 1.00 10.00
67 Other investment offices 2512 3.00 0.00 3.00 3.00
73 Business services 105248 4.59 7.20 1.00 49.00
79 Amusement and recreation services 1393 3.86 0.63 1.00 4.00
80 Health services 47445 4.00 0.00 4.00 4.00
82 Educational services 4221 5.00 0.00 5.00 5.00
87 Engineering, accounting, management ser. 4086 3.00 0.00 3.00 3.00
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Table 5: Percentage of the Options that Vest on the First Vesting Date
This table reports the percentage of the option grants that vest on the first vesting date. The summary
statistics are computed over all grants in the sample period. We organize the summary statistics by the
two-digit firm-level SIC categories as reported in CRSP.
SIC Industry Number Mean Standard Minimum Maximum
2-Digit of Grants Deviation
% % % %
15 Building construction 5396 31.49 17.18 25.00 100.00
28 Chemicals and allied products 485527 85.52 30.43 2.78 100.00
29 Petroleum refining and related 516 100.00 0.00 100.00 100.00
30 Rubber and plastics products 358 32.94 1.77 25.00 33.33
33 Primary metal industries 19814 35.54 26.06 25.00 100.00
34 Fabricated metal products 254 74.80 35.92 16.67 100.00
35 Industrial machinery and computers 66228 26.13 6.21 16.67 50.00
36 Electronic and other electrical 152362 21.14 19.41 2.08 100.00
37 Transportation equipment 937 36.39 13.96 33.33 100.00
38 Measuring, analyzing, controlling instruments 15865 27.37 22.00 2.08 100.00
39 Miscellaneous manufacturing 17549 29.95 4.09 25.00 33.33
48 Communications 221884 97.11 13.10 1.15 100.00
49 Electric, gas, and sanitary services 4903 27.95 3.97 25.00 33.30
50 Wholesale trade - Durable goods 12763 95.11 17.38 33.33 100.00
51 Wholesale trade - Non-durable goods 17871 44.83 33.37 20.00 100.00
53 General merchandise stores 37599 21.12 2.10 14.29 33.33
57 Home Furnishing stores 1524 36.16 9.09 25.00 100.00
58 Eating and drinking places 8041 48.85 38.09 20.00 100.00
59 Miscellaneous retail 73900 31.69 8.05 12.50 100.00
60 Depository institutions 141363 63.84 30.88 12.50 100.00
62 Brokers, dealers,and exchanges 6602 59.81 2.44 25.00 100.00
63 Insurance carriers 20575 29.82 5.18 10.00 100.00
67 Other investment offices 2512 33.33 0.00 33.33 33.33
73 Business services 105249 48.33 32.20 2.08 100.00
79 Amusement and recreation services 1393 28.50 15.82 25.00 100.00
80 Health services 47913 25.00 0.00 25.00 25.00
82 Educational services 4221 20.00 0.00 20.00 20.00
87 Engineering, accounting, management ser. 4086 33.33 0.00 33.33 33.33
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Table 6: Vesting Time (in Months) of the Options
This table reports the total time required to fully vest an option grant. Time is measured in months from
the date of issuance to the month at which the grant is fully vested. The summary statistics are computed
over all grants in the sample period. We organize the summary statistics by the two-digit firm-level SIC
categories as reported in CRSP.
SIC Industry Number Mean Standard Minimum Maximum
2-Digit of Grants Deviation
15 Building construction 5396 43.28 10.99 0.00 48.00
28 Chemicals and allied products 485527 22.77 17.20 0.00 120.00
29 Petroleum refining and related 516 12.00 0.00 12.00 12.00
30 Rubber and plastics products 358 36.38 2.92 25.00 48.00
33 Primary metal industries 19814 38.48 14.39 0.00 48.00
34 Fabricated metal products 254 54.59 15.98 0.00 72.00
35 Industrial machinery and computers 66228 47.63 8.19 12.00 72.00
36 Electronic and other electrical 152362 55.52 24.44 0.00 84.00
37 Transportation equipment 937 34.79 5.52 0.00 36.00
38 Measuring, analyzing, controlling instruments 15865 47.41 15.73 0.00 60.00
39 Miscellaneous manufacturing 17549 30.17 14.73 12.00 48.00
48 Communications 221884 7.97 14.35 0.00 121.00
49 Electric, gas, and sanitary services 4903 43.59 5.82 25.00 48.00
50 Wholesale trade - Durable goods 12763 35.84 2.36 0.00 36.00
51 Wholesale trade - Non-durable goods 17871 15.02 15.37 0.00 48.00
53 General merchandise stores 37599 57.43 5.70 36.00 108.00
57 Home Furnishing stores 1524 35.35 4.87 0.00 48.00
58 Eating and drinking places 8041 48.79 14.94 0.00 60.00
59 Miscellaneous retail 73900 42.48 17.07 0.00 72.00
60 Depository institutions 141363 24.35 20.07 0.00 111.00
62 Brokers, dealers,and exchanges 6602 35.98 0.96 1.00 48.00
63 Insurance carriers 20575 41.34 7.28 0.00 120.00
67 Other investment offices 2512 35.99 0.36 26.00 36.00
73 Business services 105249 35.60 15.95 0.00 108.00
79 Amusement and recreation services 1393 45.76 9.99 0.00 48.00
80 Health services 47913 47.94 0.73 36.00 48.00
82 Educational services 4221 59.99 0.27 50.00 60.00
87 Engineering, accounting, management ser. 4086 36.00 0.16 26.00 36.00
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Table 7: Maturity of the Options (in months) at their Issuance Date
This table reports the maturity on option grants at the issuance date. The maturity is measured as the
number of months between the issuance date and the expiry date on the grant. The summary statistics
are computed over all grants in the sample period. We organize the summary statistics by the two-digit
firm-level SIC categories as reported in CRSP.
SIC Industry Number Mean Standard Minimum Maximum
2-Digit of Grants Deviation
15 Building construction 5396 120.00 0.00 120.00 120.00
28 Chemicals and allied products 485518 105.09 30.51 1.00 240.00
29 Petroleum refining and related 516 120.00 0.00 120.00 120.00
30 Rubber and plastics products 358 120.00 0.00 120.00 120.00
33 Primary metal industries 19814 120.00 0.00 120.00 120.00
34 Fabricated metal products 254 120.00 0.00 120.00 120.00
35 Industrial machinery and computers 66228 94.15 16.81 72.00 120.00
36 Electronic and other electrical 152150 120.00 0.00 120.00 120.00
37 Transportation equipment 937 120.00 0.00 120.00 120.00
38 Measuring, analyzing, controlling instruments 15865 120.00 0.00 120.00 120.00
39 Miscellaneous manufacturing 17549 120.00 0.00 120.00 120.00
48 Communications 221884 91.74 40.55 3.00 240.00
49 Electric, gas, and sanitary services 4903 120.00 0.00 120.00 120.00
50 Wholesale trade - Durable goods 12763 120.00 0.00 120.00 120.00
51 Wholesale trade - Non-durable goods 17871 120.00 0.00 120.00 120.00
53 General merchandise stores 37599 130.05 22.41 120.00 180.00
57 Home Furnishing stores 1524 120.00 0.00 120.00 120.00
58 Eating and drinking places 8041 120.01 0.49 120.00 151.00
59 Miscellaneous retail 73029 120.00 0.00 120.00 120.00
60 Depository institutions 141211 120.35 0.48 120.00 121.00
62 Brokers, dealers,and exchanges 6602 120.00 0.00 120.00 120.00
63 Insurance carriers 20575 120.00 0.00 120.00 120.00
67 Other investment offices 2512 120.00 0.00 120.00 120.00
73 Business services 101954 119.47 7.77 6.00 120.00
79 Amusement and recreation services 1393 120.00 0.00 120.00 120.00
80 Health services 47445 120.00 0.00 120.00 120.00
82 Educational services 4221 120.00 0.00 120.00 120.00
87 Engineering, accounting, management ser. 4086 120.00 0.00 120.00 120.00
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Table 8: Remaining Term on the Option at the Time of Exercise
This table provides the summary statistics over the sample period for the remaining term (in days) on the
option at the date the option is exercised. The remaining term is measured as the difference between the
date of expiry and the exercise date. We organize the summary statistics by the two-digit firm-level SIC
categories as reported in CRSP.
SIC Industry Number of Mean Standard Minimum Maximum
2-Digit Exercise Deviation
Events
15 Building construction 6783 2463.28 641.26 0.00 3469.00
28 Chemicals and allied products 304666 1652.36 1189.19 0.00 4639.00
29 Petroleum refining and related 441 2215.86 894.31 0.00 3283.00
30 Rubber and plastics products 385 1989.95 966.09 1.00 3525.00
33 Primary metal industries 13503 2553.46 634.02 0.00 3646.00
34 Fabricated metal products 32 254.69 341.78 0.00 1081.00
35 Industrial machinery and computers 32538 1479.36 918.36 0.00 3616.00
36 Electronic and other electrical 74130 2774.71 496.21 101.00 3649.00
37 Transportation equipment 1000 2760.48 457.88 408.00 3483.00
38 Measuring, analyzing, controlling instruments 12645 2211.45 881.85 0.00 3643.00
39 Miscellaneous manufacturing 7942 2673.84 678.32 0.00 3469.00
48 Communications 32057 469.70 869.62 0.00 5261.00
49 Electric, gas, and sanitary services 5771 2548.85 519.43 25.00 3478.00
50 Wholesale trade - Durable goods 5970 2068.94 590.10 0.00 3349.00
51 Wholesale trade - Non-durable goods 6160 2495.33 630.19 307.00 3515.00
53 General merchandise stores 34840 2257.78 1016.00 0.00 5292.00
57 Home Furnishing stores 471 2815.73 410.91 1598.00 3629.00
58 Eating and drinking places 4891 1465.18 1186.71 0.00 3429.00
59 Miscellaneous retail 69797 2330.87 652.46 0.00 3650.00
60 Depository institutions 100146 2294.56 774.64 0.00 3896.00
62 Brokers, dealers,and exchanges 3900 1897.79 341.32 480.00 3638.00
63 Insurance carriers 10937 2607.62 541.60 0.00 3479.00
67 Other investment offices 645 2416.62 722.16 360.00 3425.00
73 Business services 86279 2581.08 671.23 0.00 3629.00
79 Amusement and recreation services 1842 2645.29 474.67 420.00 3385.00
80 Health services 52085 2480.48 614.84 0.00 3545.00
82 Educational services 933 2265.49 597.72 872.00 3367.00
87 Engineering, accounting, management ser. 3135 1930.18 1018.85 0.00 3368.00
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Table 9: Number of Days that the Option was In-the-Money from the Vesting Day to the
Exercise Day
This table reports the summary statistics for the number of days that the option was in-the-money from
the vesting day on the options to the date of exercise. We sum all days between the vesting date and the
exercise date where the ratio of stock price to the strike price is greater than or equal to one. We organize
the summary statistics by the two-digit firm-level SIC categories as reported in CRSP.
SIC Industry Number of Mean Standard Minimum Maximum
2-Digit Exercise Deviation
Events
15 Building construction 6783 286.0 475.6 0.0 3586.0
28 Chemicals and allied products 304666 1069.8 1114.0 0.0 3665.0
29 Petroleum refining and related 441 1057.6 921.3 0.0 3313.0
30 Rubber and plastics products 385 736.1 810.1 0.0 2563.0
33 Primary metal industries 13503 223.1 331.5 0.0 2212.0
34 Fabricated metal products 32 765.6 884.4 0.0 2242.0
35 Industrial machinery and computers 32538 297.0 365.7 0.0 2218.0
36 Electronic and other electrical 74130 79.1 226.7 0.0 3253.0
37 Transportation equipment 1000 88.0 205.0 0.0 2164.0
38 Measuring, analyzing, controlling instruments 12645 237.0 422.2 0.0 2929.0
39 Miscellaneous manufacturing 7942 190.1 407.3 0.0 2207.0
48 Communications 32057 2865.3 1270.8 0.0 3990.0
49 Electric, gas, and sanitary services 5771 122.2 192.0 0.0 2004.0
50 Wholesale trade - Durable goods 5970 510.4 588.7 0.0 2792.0
51 Wholesale trade - Non-durable goods 6160 695.3 768.5 0.0 3208.0
53 General merchandise stores 34840 321.1 470.1 0.0 3527.0
57 Home Furnishing stores 471 118.6 129.7 0.0 971.0
58 Eating and drinking places 4891 315.5 420.1 0.0 3124.0
59 Miscellaneous retail 69797 222.6 406.6 0.0 2716.0
60 Depository institutions 100146 768.8 824.2 0.0 4667.0
62 Brokers, dealers,and exchanges 3900 684.7 321.3 0.0 2631.0
63 Insurance carriers 10937 117.5 164.7 0.0 1826.0
67 Other investment offices 645 126.0 348.0 0.0 2022.0
73 Business services 86279 473.3 572.8 0.0 3676.0
79 Amusement and recreation services 1842 147.3 249.2 0.0 2543.0
80 Health services 52085 203.6 338.6 0.0 2220.0
82 Educational services 933 164.7 147.7 0.0 971.0
87 Engineering, accounting, management ser. 3135 344.4 674.9 0.0 2567.0
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Table 10: Ratio of the Stock Price to the Strike Price at the Time of Exercise
This table reports summary statistics over the sample period for the ratio of the stock price to the strike
price (S/K) on the date the option is exercised. Both the price and the strike are adjusted for splits. We
organize the summary statistics by the two-digit firm-level SIC categories as reported in CRSP.
SIC Industry Number of Mean Standard Minimum Maximum
2-Digit Exercise Deviation
Events
15 Building construction 6783 10.08 6.59 1.92 53.26
28 Chemicals and allied products 304666 3.38 2.40 1.00 329.63
29 Petroleum refining and related 441 1.95 0.89 1.01 9.22
30 Rubber and plastics products 385 1.64 0.41 1.00 3.59
33 Primary metal industries 13503 4.03 2.75 1.00 23.19
34 Fabricated metal products 32 3.19 2.41 1.03 8.76
35 Industrial machinery and computers 32538 3.45 2.17 1.00 29.66
36 Electronic and other electrical 74130 1.57 1.31 1.00 20.64
37 Transportation equipment 1000 4.08 2.14 1.53 21.62
38 Measuring, analyzing, controlling instruments 12645 3.30 2.09 1.00 21.51
39 Miscellaneous manufacturing 7942 2.07 0.82 1.00 9.82
48 Communications 32057 2.03 1.58 1.00 21.76
49 Electric, gas, and sanitary services 5771 1.87 0.48 1.01 7.77
50 Wholesale trade - Durable goods 5970 1.76 0.91 1.02 13.58
51 Wholesale trade - Non-durable goods 6160 4.99 3.03 1.00 18.27
53 General merchandise stores 34840 5.91 5.28 1.00 95.65
57 Home Furnishing stores 471 2.50 1.73 1.03 13.23
58 Eating and drinking places 4891 1.69 0.77 1.00 10.17
59 Miscellaneous retail 69797 4.07 6.73 1.00 81.62
60 Depository institutions 100146 6.16 8.69 1.00 147.58
62 Brokers, dealers,and exchanges 3900 3.22 1.23 1.16 8.73
63 Insurance carriers 10937 1.86 0.80 1.01 20.24
67 Other investment offices 645 2.06 0.41 1.08 2.84
73 Business services 86279 7.03 16.01 1.00 335.10
79 Amusement and recreation services 1842 7.18 2.38 2.61 14.14
80 Health services 52085 11.48 12.14 1.00 215.26
82 Educational services 933 2.04 1.17 1.01 6.60
87 Engineering, accounting, management ser. 3135 3.92 3.14 1.01 17.31
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Table 11: Percentage of the Grant’s Vested Options That Are Exercised
This table reports the summary statistics for the percentage of each grant’s vested options that are exercised
on the date of exercise. The percentage is computed as the ratio of the number of options exercised to the
total number of number of vested options on the grant that are still unexercised. We then compute the
summary statistics using the total vested options outstanding to control for the size of the employee’s option
position. We organize the summary statistics by the two-digit firm-level SIC categories as reported in CRSP.
SIC Industry Number of Mean Standard Minimum Maximum
2-Digit Exercise Deviation
Events
% % % %
15 Building construction 6783 72.85 26.02 100.00 0.70
28 Chemicals and allied products 304666 70.54 32.33 100.00 0.10
29 Petroleum refining and related 441 90.63 31.66 100.00 6.70
30 Rubber and plastics products 385 78.75 29.41 100.00 1.70
33 Primary metal industries 13503 66.22 26.51 100.00 0.10
34 Fabricated metal products 32 64.56 29.37 100.00 6.90
35 Industrial machinery and computers 32538 76.96 30.40 100.00 0.10
36 Electronic and other electrical 74130 51.18 24.91 100.00 0.10
37 Transportation equipment 1000 79.92 28.15 100.00 0.60
38 Measuring, analyzing, controlling instruments 12645 65.52 24.20 100.00 0.50
39 Miscellaneous manufacturing 7942 56.50 25.21 100.00 0.10
48 Communications 32057 78.38 31.97 100.00 1.00
49 Electric, gas, and sanitary services 5771 73.66 33.27 100.00 1.20
50 Wholesale trade - Durable goods 5970 76.60 34.61 100.00 1.10
51 Wholesale trade - Non-durable goods 6160 22.16 8.65 100.00 0.20
53 General merchandise stores 34840 53.56 24.59 100.00 0.10
57 Home Furnishing stores 471 67.29 24.73 100.00 4.10
58 Eating and drinking places 4891 72.57 33.10 100.00 1.30
59 Miscellaneous retail 69797 39.85 17.36 100.00 0.10
60 Depository institutions 100146 63.30 28.59 100.00 0.10
62 Brokers, dealers,and exchanges 3900 79.97 28.44 100.00 3.30
63 Insurance carriers 10937 75.29 29.07 100.00 0.10
67 Other investment offices 645 69.43 28.72 100.00 0.50
73 Business services 86279 61.53 28.47 100.00 0.10
79 Amusement and recreation services 1842 75.37 28.86 100.00 7.70
80 Health services 52085 60.00 23.92 100.00 0.10
82 Educational services 933 88.96 30.43 100.00 6.10
87 Engineering, accounting, management ser. 3135 31.37 15.64 100.00 0.00
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Table 12: Summary Statistics for the Covariate Paths
This table reports the summary statistics for the employee-grant-day paths for option grants in the sample.
The price-to-strike ratio is the daily observation of the ratio of the split-adjusted price of the stock to the
split-adjusted strike price on the option (the zero valued minimum is due to our reporting precision). The
dividend payment is equal to the split-adjusted dividend payment on each day. This value is zero on all but
dividend payment days. The firm beta was estimated for each firm using market and firm data from CRSP
and interest rate data from the Federal Reserve Board over a five year interval (in some cases the interval is
shorter) and is a constant for each firm. The vesting period within two weeks is an indicator variable that is
one if the day is within two weeks of a vesting event and zero otherwise. The stock return volatility is the
standard deviation of the daily stock returns, as reported in CRSP, over the past thirty trading days. The
price relative to the 90th percentile is an indicator variable that is equal to one if the observed stock price is
greater than or equal to 90th percentile of the stock price distribution over the prior year of trading. It is
equal to zero otherwise.
Variable Mean Standard Minimum Maximum
Deviation
Price-to-Strike Ratio 2.368 7.525 1.000 220.700
Stock return volatility past thirty days 0.019 0.012 0.001 0.398
Firm Beta 1.034 0.323 0.213 2.340
Vesting event within two weeks (Indicator variable) 0.034 0.182 0 1
Price relative to 90th percentile (indicator variable) 0.596 0.491 0 1
Remaining time (days) 2480.000 714.750 181.000 5292.000
n = 701,486,213
Table 13: Employee Demographics
This table presents summary statistics for the demographic information that is reported by a subset of the
firms in the sample. We summarize the information by employees over the sample period.
Number Mean Standard Minimum Maximum
of Employees Deviation
Age 203897 43.68 12.97 17.00 85.00
Salary 54419 293871.35 358877.38 10190.00 36835200.00
sex 172523 0.55 0.50 0.00 1.00
Executive 350199 0.01 0.12 0.00 1.00
Managers 350199 0.14 0.34 0.00 1.00
Board member 350199 0.01 0.07 0.00 1.00
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Table 14: Cancellation Rates and Reason for Cancellations
This table presents the rates of cancellation events for all firms over the sample period. Only some of the
firms reported the reason for cancellations. Of those firms that report the reason for the termination, the
category Terminate Position includes all cancellations arising from employment terminations that are either
voluntary or involuntary. The other categories that are reported include deaths and retirements. The many
of cancellations do not have further information concerning the reason for the cancellation.
Cancellation Due to
year Total Employees Voluntary or Involuntary Cancellation Cancellation Cancellation for
Beginning of Year Termination Due to Retirement Due to Death Unknown Reason
1983 206 0.0049 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000
1984 269 0.0520 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000
1985 665 0.0421 0.0015 0.0000 0.0000
1986 1007 0.0278 0.0050 0.0000 0.0020
1987 3583 0.0070 0.0011 0.0000 0.0000
1988 4396 0.0560 0.0364 0.0000 0.0018
1989 5010 0.0521 0.0321 0.0010 0.0022
1990 5687 0.0570 0.0387 0.0002 0.0039
1991 6710 0.0735 0.0210 0.0001 0.0028
1992 134806 0.0091 0.0017 0.0004 0.0001
1993 135897 0.0188 0.0025 0.0001 0.0001
1994 137524 0.0151 0.0029 0.0001 0.0002
1995 132076 0.0167 0.0064 0.0009 0.0005
1996 146865 0.0212 0.0075 0.0008 0.0003
1997 159927 0.0167 0.0069 0.0005 0.0002
1998 221543 0.0219 0.0066 0.0003 0.0001
1999 233544 0.0317 0.0137 0.0003 0.0001
2000 247536 0.0299 0.0135 0.0002 0.0002
2001 309606 0.0414 0.0226 0.0005 0.0002
2002 348034 0.0597 0.0440 0.0004 0.0019
2003 364742 0.0584 0.0377 0.0004 0.0026
2004 381349 0.0713 0.0410 0.0004 0.0014
2005 368994 0.0830 0.0267 0.0004 0.0012
2006 275908 0.0520 0.0186 0.0006 0.0011
2007 257663 0.2680 0.0046 0.0014 0.0001
Total 3349976 0.0633 0.0187 0.0005 0.0008
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Table 15: Cancellation Rates and Reason for Cancellations by One Digit SIC
This table presents the average rates of cancellation for one digit Standard Industrial Classification (SIS) for
all firms over the sample period.
Manufacturing Transportation, Retail Finance, Services
Communications Insurance,
& Utilities & Real Estate
SIC (one digit) 2 3 4 5 6 7 8
Year 15 27 5 14 7 15 4
1995 0.043 0.053 0.002 0.039 0.052 0.063 0.064
1996 0.035 0.063 0.001 0.059 0.024 0.026 0.056
1997 0.041 0.020 0.000 0.058 0.099 0.036 0.078
1998 0.062 0.083 0.000 0.062 0.073 0.050 0.081
1999 0.050 0.063 0.000 0.050 0.045 0.026 0.122
2000 0.050 0.041 0.001 0.056 0.112 0.050 0.106
2001 0.046 0.158 0.001 0.079 0.054 0.082 0.080
2002 0.057 0.136 0.006 0.066 0.084 0.099 0.068
2003 0.042 0.144 0.031 0.066 0.160 0.112 0.065
2004 0.047 0.116 0.130 0.061 0.095 0.060 0.055
2005 0.075 0.077 0.441 0.041 0.069 0.099 0.046
2006 0.050 0.055 0.027 0.024 0.046 0.301 0.063
2007 0.253 0.001 0.471 0.002 0.006 0.028 0.091
Annual Average 0.065 0.078 0.086 0.051 0.071 0.079 0.075
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Table 16: Estimation Results
This table presents the results for alternative specifications of the fractional logistic estimator. Specifications
1 and 2 are estimated on the full sample. In specification 1, we exclude both the sex and age covariates and
the firm fixed effects. Specification 2 includes firm fixed effects and again excludes the sex and age covariates.
Specifications 3 and 4 are estimated with a smaller subsample of firms that reported information on sex and
age. Specification 3 includes sex and age and excludes firm fixed effects. Specification 4 includes sex, age
and firm fixed effects. The standard errors are reported in parentheses below the coefficient estimates. The
estimator clusters at the level of the individual employee.
Coefficient Estimates
(Standard Errors)
Covariates
Constant -6.009
(0.001)
Price-to-strike ratio 0.003
(0.00003)
Stock return volatility over prior 66 trading days -0.180
(0.16)
Firm beta -0.193
(0.007)
Vesting event in prior 10 trading days (Indicator Variable) 2.356
(0.005)
Price ≥ 90th percentile of prior year distribution (Indicator Variable) 0.176
(0.004)
Remaining calendar days until expiration at the time of exercise -0.00005
(0.000003)
One-Digit SIC Fixed Effects Yes
Number of observations 701.4M
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